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The elections on Sunday June 7 were the most important general
elections in recent Turkish political history. With a huge turnout, more
women in parliament, better Kurdish political representation and a clear
‘no’ to a presidential system, the future of Turkish democracy looks
promising. However, a hung parliament and potential early elections
might jeopardise this. Regrettably, the AK Party’s initial interpretation of
the elections, particularly regarding the HDP’s success, is an unfortunate
start.
Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s (pictured) party did not manage to secure the
majority of seats. (UNAOC, flickr.com)
The outcome of the elections represents a fascinating push for Turkey to
become a more pluralist democratic country. A resounding 87% turnout
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showed Turkish voters’ interest in shaping the political future of the
country and the majority said ‘no’ to changing the parliamentary system
to a presidential one. The number of female MPs increased from 76 to 96;
yet the most important outcome of the elections is the 13.1% of votes
that went to the HDP (Peoples’ Democracy Party). For the first time,
Kurdish politicians were present as a party in the parliament not as
independent MPs. Moreover, in the previous parliament there were 36
independent MPs affiliated with an earlier incarnation of the HDP (the
BDP – Peace and Democracy Party), but today, this number has increased
to 80. Potentially, this is promising for the future of Turkish democracy
and the Kurdish peace talks. However, this will very much depend on
whether a new government can be formed and, if so, what shape it takes.
Unfortunately, the Justice and Development Party’s (AK Party, also known
as AKP) initial reaction of the HDP’s success does not bode well.
The AK Party lost 9% of its vote share, from 49.9% in the 2011 elections to
40.8% with its seats decreasing from 327 to 258. The HDP reaching the
extremely high 10% threshold (a party needs to receive at least 10% of
the national vote to enter the parliament) was the biggest blow to the AK
Party’s aspirations to form yet another majority government. The deputy
Prime Minister Bulent Arinc in his post-election statement claimed that
the Nationalist People Party (MHP) and the Republican People’s Party
(CHP) enabled HDP’s success and he said the HDP was used as a
spearhead pushed by these two parties.
It is true that the MHP and the CHP saw the benefits of having the HDP in
parliament – simply, a smaller number of AK Party seats. The AK Party
needed at least 276 seats to form a single party government and 367
seats to be able to change the constitution and move Turkey towards a
presidential system, which is now impossible. During the election
campaigns, both the MHP and the CHP softened their anti-HDP discourse
and used a more consensual language, much to the AK Party’s
disappointment. A proportion of non-Kurdish voters in urban areas voted
for the HDP because of its party programme and rhetoric based on
democracy, pluralism, gender-equality, LGBT rights and
environmentalism, but also as an anti-AK Party strategy to help the HDP
pass the 10% threshold. However, if what Arinc says was true, the HDP
should’ve received more votes in areas where the AK Party has
consistently been the biggest party, but this didn’t happen. The outcome
indicates that the HDP barely received 2% of the votes in these areas.
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The HDP passed the threshold and the AK Party lost a big proportion of
its support base due to reasons far more influential than supposed
support from other parties. Basically, people did not want to see another
single party government formed by the AK Party. Erdogan’s actions since
he became president have gone beyond a Turkish president’s
constitutional area of activity. He has been behaving more like a head of
government than a president, which is supposed be a non-partisan
neutral position according to the Turkish constitution. For instance, he
was at the centre of the AK Party election campaign, giving speeches
every day in support of the party, bashing other parties, and openly
declaring his biased position towards the AK Party. Increasingly, larger
proportions of Turkish society find Erdogan and the AK Party’s
authoritarian attitude, their tendency to push the boundaries set by legal
norms and regulations, their polarising rhetoric and their assumption
that the Turkish electorate can be convinced through populist policies
and discourse very vexing.
Contrasting with this arrogant and polarising attitude, the co-leader of the
HDP, Selahattin Demirtas has adopted a consensual style and his
pluralist, democratic, and egalitarian rhetoric found him many friendly
ears among the Turkish society. The ongoing peace talks and the halt of
the military conflict also have given some level of legitimacy to the party
and facilitated the shift in votes towards the HDP. For example, AK Party
supporters in eastern and southeastern Turkey shifted their support to
the HDP. Similarly, the MHP’s vote share increased from 13% to 16%
across Turkey, mainly as a response to the Kurdish peace process. All
these reasons contributed to the AK Party’s loss of the majority.
HDP flags (Julia Buzaud, flickr.com)
Clearly, Arinc’s blame of the MHP and the CHP for the HDP’s success
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shows that the AK Party does not see the electoral outcome as a reaction
to their authoritarian and paternalist single-party rule. Furthermore, it
overlooks the possibility that electors might have chosen to vote
strategically rather than ideologically. The AK Party’s insistence on
blaming other parties also reveals its top-down and increasingly elitist
political mentality – a mentality that underestimates public opinion and
perceives the elections through the prism of populism instead of
pluralism.
What’s more, the AK Party’s initial response shows an apparent
unawareness of the impact of recent events on public opinion. The Gezi
protests in mid-2013 and the subsequent severe government and police
response to the protestors not only revealed the authoritarianism and
intolerance of the AK Party, but also its social engineering attempts to
create a conservative Turkish society. The corruption scandal, which
began in 2013 and involved four ministers and Erdogan’s family,
generated also a significant reaction among the Turkish population. The
scandal was initiated by the Gulenists’, a transnational Islamist group led
by Abdullah Gulen who preaches a moderate blend of Islam. In response,
the AK Party government heightened pressure on the Gulenists (the
parallel state, as the party calls them now). Lastly, the AK Party’s
aggressive and unconstructive foreign policy in the Middle East, which
has sectarian tones, and the decline in Turkey’s economic growth are
other important factors that led to the decrease in the party’s vote share.
In a nutshell, the AK Party’s conception of the HDP’s success as generated
by the MHP and the CHP is unfounded.
The response to the Gezi protests revealed the authoritarianism and
intolerance of the AK Party (David, flickr.com)
In any case, the HDP is now in parliament and for the first time in Turkish
political history, Kurds are represented as a party. This will surely impact
the Kurdish peace process and further legitimise Kurdish politics in
Turkey. Not being able to pass the threshold would’ve led the Kurds to
put emphasis on the high electoral threshold system and further restrain
PKK-government relations. However, to what extent the HDP is able to
influence the peace process depends on how the new government
handles the talks. Political representation in the parliament is an
important step in securing the peace process. Although initiated by the
AK Party, the peace process was mainly maintained thanks to the public
support for peace despite the government’s own sabotaging behaviour at
times and the Turkish nationalist opposition. Hopefully, the next
government will continue the peace talks with the reality of the HDP as a
more integral part of Turkish politics in mind.
The important determinant will be the new government or whether a new
government will form at all. Typical to post-election processes with no
outright majority, a number of scenarios and readings between the lines
of leaders’ speeches are dominating media discussions at the moment.
The AK Party will now either form a minority government or have to talk
to other parties to generate a coalition government. If the new AK Party
leader is not successful in forming the coalition or if a new coalition
cabinet does not pass the confidence vote within 45 days, the President
can call for elections.
An early election might potentially disrupt the peace process and the
trust that Kurdish voters have in the Turkish political system. Erdogan and
the AK Party might consider the early election option as a serious
possibility, and in doing so, may feed into the negative memory of
instability of coalition governments of the 90s. Still, the elections showed
that most of the population does not appreciate the party’s increasingly
authoritarian rule, prefers a coalition government and is happy to see
Kurds represented in the parliament. These are important lessons for all
parties involved. Unfortunately all this may not matter. A cautious hope is
in order, as Turkey might be facing a process of instability generated by
the AK Party to show the ‘vices’ of parliamentary systems.
